

PPS 501 • HST 567 • PS 562
American Grand Strategy

Duke University

Sanford School of Public Policy

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Tuesdays, 10:15am–12:45pm

Prof. Bruce Jentleson

Email: bwj7@duke.edu
Office: 122 Rubenstein Hall
Telephone: (919) 613-9208
Office hours: Thursdays, 7:30pm–8:30pm
Or by appointment

Prof. Simon Miles

Email: simon.miles@duke.edu
Office: 130 Rubenstein Hall
Telephone: (919) 613-9560
Office hours: Mondays, 4:00pm–5:00pm
Or by appointment

THE COURSE

Overview

This course examines the global challenges and opportunities confronting the United States and the efforts of US policy-makers to craft a grand strategy that adequately addresses them. It covers key historical junctures in the development of American Grand Strategy, from the early Republic to the present, concentrating on post–World War II to the present. The class will examine both the theory and the practice of grand strategy, and it will consider both defenses and critiques of the choices US leaders have made.

While carrying over much of the approach from prior years, we are making two significant changes. One is to give greater attention to the role of race in American foreign policy — an issue long there, its importance has been accentuated by recent events. Another is that, given COVID-19, we will teaching the course fully online. We are working at making this format as effective as possible. We need each member of the class to commit to doing so as well, including ideas you may have about online techniques and formats. Conditions permitting, we may also be able to have one-on-one in-person meetings.

This semester will be unlike any other at Duke. We are committed to being flexible and accommodating when it comes to the syllabus. We ask that you communicate with us as far in advance as possible, and for your understanding as we all navigate uncharted waters.

Learning Objectives

This class is designed to be the capstone course for advanced undergraduates who have had extensive preparation in international relations, international security, and American foreign

policy. It is also designed to be an interdisciplinary seminar for graduate students, especially those in political science, history, and public policy.

Our principal objectives are fivefold:

1. Develop an analytic framework and historical context for understanding contemporary US foreign policy.
2. Enhance your capacity to evaluate competing analyses — theories, historical interpretations, political arguments — about US foreign policy.
3. Discuss how US foreign policy has affected race issues at home and how race has affected foreign policy, historically and contemporaneously.
4. Strengthen your policy analysis and scholarly research, writing, and oral communication skills.
5. Foster a learning community that helps achieve these other objectives and builds relationships of value beyond this course.

AGS Events

The American Grand Strategy program will (virtually) bring to Duke a range of visiting speakers. Attendance will be open to a wider group but is expected for students in the AGS course (with reasonable frequency). Pay attention to email notices about upcoming speakers.

For speakers in AGS events or other relevant Duke series that have direct bearing on our course's materials, we will ask each student to share their responses to the event with seminar once in the semester. You should be prepared to not only summarize what was said, but also to link it directly with what we have covered in the class thus far and also to share your own critical analysis. This will be factored into your participation grade.

Foreign Policy Café

Every other week, one of the professors will host an informal half-hour discussion session on current events and major questions in American foreign policy. These will meet the weeks of:

24 August

5 October

7 September

19 October

21 September

2 November

Specific dates and times will be confirmed later on, in order to enable as many students as are interested to participate. These sessions will be voluntary and will have no bearing on your grade in the course.

If of interest, we will also hold an informal session on careers and graduate-school opportunities in foreign policy and national security.

Communication & Getting Together

The professors make extensive use of email to communicate with the class and so every student is expected to check his or her Duke email at least once a day. Email is a much better way of

getting ahold of us than our office telephones. Students should be familiar with the email and other communication tools built into Sakai.

We are committed to being as accessible as possible under the circumstances, whether to discuss the course or other topics. Sadly, this semester we will not have much (if any) opportunity to run into one another on campus, in our offices, at an AGS event, or elsewhere. Our office hours (taking place on Zoom) are noted above, and we are also available by appointment.

To help us get to know you, we will have one-on-one meetings with every student during the first two weeks of the semester.

In general, we hope all students will communicate with us and each other. If students have ideas as to how we can foster the sense of community which has historically been one of this course's strong suits, please let us know how we can support that.

RESPONSIBILITIES & GRADING

Students taking this course should expect to be graded rigorously. While we do not adhere strictly to a curve, you should expect the normal distribution of grades to be something approximating the following: A-range grades reserved for exceptional work, B-range grades reserved for students who perform consistently and well throughout the semester, and C-range and below grades reserved for students whose work is lacking in quality, consistency, or both. If a final course grade is at the cusp (e.g., between A- and B+), progression over the semester will be taken into account.

The course includes undergraduates, Masters and Ph.D. students. The main difference in course requirements is on the final paper; Ph.D. students will have a different assignment (see below). Your final grade will be comprised of the following portions:

Undergraduates & MA Students

Class contribution (30%)

Seminar paper (20%)

Final paper (35%)

Final paper presentation (15%)

Ph.D. Students

Class contribution (30%)

Seminar paper (20%)

Final paper (50%)

Each assignment will be graded on a 100-point scale and weighted as above.

In all your work you are expected to be familiar with and abide by all rules and norms for academic integrity, particularly those established in the Duke Community Standard: <https://studentaffairs.duke.edu/conduct/about-us/duke-community-standard>. The Duke Library also provides helpful research guidelines for research, including for avoiding plagiarism: <http://library.duke.edu/research/guides/citing/>. Plagiarism is a serious violation and will be treated as such.

CLASS CONTRIBUTION

Class contribution refers to the preparation, participation, and quality of input each student gives to the course. We teach this course as a seminar, encouraging, relying on, and requiring consistent, committed, and creative student engagement. We read a lot. We write a lot. We discuss a lot. Expectations are for attendance at all classes and for consistent, intensive and creative engagement. That means doing the reading as assigned, reading each other's final papers as part of your preparation for class, introducing your own thinking into discussions, and generally "digesting" not just "ingesting" the materials. While personal styles vary, all students are expected to be active participants in the course. This is not necessarily measured by "quantity" — quality matters too, including demonstration of analytic thinking, engaging in constructive critiques (of lectures, readings, student papers), and others.

WRITING ASSIGNMENTS

All submissions are to be made electronically via email as Word documents (12-point conventional font, double-spaced) and not as PDFs as we will grade and comment electronically.

Papers exceeding the specified maximum lengths will be penalized.

Any paper submitted any later than the specified deadline (both date and time) will incur a 10% penalty, and another 10% for every further 24-hour period it is late.

Clear and concise prose is essential to effective presentation and analysis. Students will be graded not simply on the content of their papers, but also on the clarity with which they convey that content. Accordingly, all papers should be edited and proofread thoroughly before submission.

Plagiarism, cheating, or any other academic misconduct will automatically result in failing the course and being referred to the appropriate academic dean for disciplinary proceedings.

Students should be familiar with the Duke Community Standard and uphold it: I will not lie, cheat, or steal in my academic endeavors; I will conduct myself honorably in all my endeavors; and I will act if the Standard is compromised.

We expect every student to be familiar with academic standards concerning plagiarism. For more information, see: <https://library.duke.edu/research/plagiarism>. Penalties for such violations can be severe and follow you long after you leave Duke — it is never worth the risk.

SEMINAR PAPER

20% of your final grade.

Due 5:00pm on the Sunday preceding the relevant session emailed to the professors.

For the eight classes from 1 September to 20 October, one or two students will prepare an analytical seminar paper focusing on one of the prompts/questions listed along with each

session's assigned readings below; you are free to choose whichever one you find most engaging.

The purpose of this paper is chiefly analytical. You should convey main points the authors make but rather than just summarize the readings, your job is to marshal the evidence they provide — along with some supplemental research you do — in order to make an argument which engages the question posed. The paper does not have to touch on every single reading, rather, you should focus on those which bear directly on the question you are addressing.

While this is not primarily a research paper, supplemental research is expected for this assignment for value-added and widening the horizon of our discussion in class beyond the assigned reading. You should think about what new evidence you can bring to bear on the question at hand: primary sources (e.g. the Foreign Relations of the United States series), memoirs, or other analyses (i.e. secondary sources — the supplementary reading for each week would be a good place to start).

After the first class, we will ask you to indicate your first and second choices of week to cover over email. For weeks with two students writing, you will coordinate between yourselves as to who will answer which question.

Paper should not exceed 2,500 words. excluding bibliography, citations and any charts, tables, etc. Any professional citation method and bibliography format may be used, so long as used consistently and properly: <http://library.duke.edu/research/citing/>.

The paper is due at 5:00pm the Sunday before the relevant class.

Paper-writers will present to the class in ways that help lead and facilitate class discussion. Presentation quality will factor into the grade for this assignment.

UNDERGRADUATE & MASTERS FINAL PAPERS

50% of your final grade: 35% for the written paper and 15% for the presentation.

These are research papers with the objective of developing policy recommendations. You will need to delve into the history of an issue as well as the range of theories, strategies, and arguments that bear on the current policy debate. On the basis of your research and analysis you will recommend a policy for the United States to follow.

These are individual papers coordinated as a group for class presentation. There are four main policy areas into which students will be grouped:

1. Russia
2. Climate Change
3. China
4. The Middle East

Within these groups, students will choose particular issues. For example, within the Russia group, one paper could be on Ukraine, another on hacking, one on relevant nuclear issues, etc.

For China, papers could deal with the South China Sea, trade, North Korea, etc. For the Middle East, consider issues such as Syria, Israel-Palestine, relations with Saudi Arabia, etc. For climate change, you might address opening access to the Arctic, the debate over the Paris agreement, food or water scarcity, etc.

The key is a “Goldilocks” delineation of a topic: not too big to deal with, not so small as to not warrant detailed and lengthy treatment — just right. We will discuss this more in class, and you should work with Professors Jentleson and Miles to make sure your chosen topic is the right size.

Topic Selection

Sign up in the week following the class on Tuesday, 25 August.

We will ask you for a first choice and a second choice. There will be 3–4 students in each group with a mix of undergrads and Masters students. We will try to accommodate first choices within these parameters.

Paper Proposal

Due Sunday, 13 September at 5:00pm (or sooner) emailed to the professors.

The proposal has two components:

1. Define the central focus of the paper and provide an initial discussion of the policy debate (750 words).
2. An initial annotated bibliography of at least six major sources. Annotated means a brief description of the utility of each source for your research. Major means the kind of sources that can provide the building blocks for the whole project: e.g., books, scholarly and policy journal articles, government documents, think tank and NGO studies, not newspaper or newsmagazine articles (you eventually will use these, but they are not major sources). Remember that Googling is not the best way to do policy research. See also: <http://guides.library.duke.edu/international-relations>.

Proposals will be graded a ✓+, ✓, or ✓-. Those earning a ✓+ will have a clear and focused topic statement; political analysis sufficiently well informed for this stage; and a bibliography which includes quality sources, fits major sources guideline above, and is well and meaningfully annotated. The proposal grade would be taken into account as a tie-breaker for an overall course grade falling at a margin. More importantly, the more thought and effort you invest now, the more helpful our feedback and dialogue can be.

Final Products & Presentations

Due the Sunday before the class during which you and your group will present at 5:00pm, emailed to the professors and whole class.

Each group will have half of one class period to present on 27 October and 3 November, approximately 1 hour. Presenting means teaching and conveying important information, but also stimulating and leading discussion. We will reward in-class presentations that are well organized,

effective as teaching bringing out key points and stimulating discussion, and manage well the allotted time. Your papers will be the assigned reading for the week.

Your paper should be...

1. Well-researched, meaning that it builds a strong research base drawn from a mix of quality sources (which does not necessarily correspond to what comes up most readily on Google and other non-specialized search engines).
2. Brings to bear concepts and other material from the rest of the course, as appropriate.
3. Analysis that digests, not just ingests, shows strong command of relevant policy debates while also presenting student's own insights and arguments.
4. Provides relevant data, quantitative and/or qualitative, and uses the data effectively, particularly so as not to assert without substantiation.
5. Makes clear, well-supported and viable policy proposals: no need for purist or absolutist answers, but no fence-sitting either. As part of this, takes on the strongest arguments, theories, and doctrines on the other side.
6. Professionally presented, including use of tables and figures as enhances your paper, and proper use of citations (whichever of the standard formats you prefer) and bibliography. Any professional citation method and bibliography format may be used, so long as used consistently and properly. See: <http://library.duke.edu/research/citing/>.
7. Well written: Write, rewrite, and rewrite again.

Papers are not to exceed 5,000 words, excluding bibliography, citations and any charts, tables, etc. Any professional citation method and bibliography format may be used, so long as used consistently and properly: <http://library.duke.edu/research/guides/citing/>.

PH.D. FINAL PAPER

40% of your final grade.

The Ph.D. students have two options for their final papers:

1. An original research paper (roughly 30 pages) on a topic approved by Professors Jentleson and Miles. This paper must primarily rely on qualitative methods, befitting a course cross-listed with the History Department and co-taught by a diplomatic historian.
2. A thematic bibliographical literature review (roughly 30 pages) based on primarily qualitative material on a topic of the student's choice approved by Professors Feaver and Miles.

For either option, students are encouraged to use this assignment to make progress on their dissertation projects.

Topic and Outline

Due Sunday, 13 September at 5:00pm (or sooner) emailed to the professors.

In at most 1,000 words, define the central focus of the paper (i.e. research question), situate it in the literature, and describe your research design.

Final Product

Due Sunday, 15 November at 5:00pm emailed to the professors.

SEMINAR SCHEDULE & READINGS

The reading load is fairly heavy. There is no single text for this course, nor is it feasible to buy all the books and journals used in the course. For those interested in pursuing a weekly topic further, we also provide recommended further readings.

One book is required for the course; we recommend purchasing it:

- Hal Brands, *What Good is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Grand Strategy from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Cornell University Press, 2014).

Other readings are on the course Sakai website. As you do the readings, whether you are writing a seminar paper that week or not, think about the prompt questions provided below. For some sessions we also provide a kick-off discussion question.

On Thursdays, we will send out a scene-setter (usually in the form of a short video recording) to help you think about the next week's readings, offer some context for them and the session as a whole, and suggest some more issues and big debates you might bear in mind as you prepare.

18 Aug. What is Strategy and Grand Strategy?

Prompt

In addition to getting to know one another and the general topic of strategy and grand strategy, we will have two kick-off discussions. Come to class prepared to engage on the following questions. (No formal written submission is required, but be prepared to make your case in class discussion.)

1. If the next president asked you what the top two foreign policy or national security issues are, what would they be and why?
2. How has US foreign policy affected race issues at home? How have race issues at home affected US foreign policy?

Readings on Strategy and Grand Strategy

Hal Brands, *What Good is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Cornell University Press, 2014).

- Intro., “The Meaning and Challenge of Grand Strategy,” pp. 1–16.

Nina Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of ‘Grand Strategy,’” *Security Studies*, vol. 27, no. 1 (2017): pp. 27–57.

William Inboden, "Statecraft, Decision-Making, and the Varieties of Historical Experience: A Taxonomy," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 37, no. 2 (2014): pp. 291–318.

Richard K. Betts, "The Grandiosity of Grand Strategy," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 42, no. 4 (2019), pp. 7–22.

Readings on Race and Foreign Policy

Meredith Loken and Kelebogile Zvobgo, "Why Race Matters in International Relations," *Foreign Policy*, 19 Jun. 2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/19/why-race-matters-international-relations-ir/>.

Kip Whittington, "The Color of Diplomacy: A U.S. Diplomat on Race and the Foreign Service," *War on the Rocks*, 30 Jul. 2020, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/the-color-of-diplomacy-reflections-from-a-u-s-diplomat-on-race-in-america-and-its-effect-on-the-foreign-service/>.

David Barno and Nora Bensahel, "Reflections on the Curse of Racism in the US Military," *War on the Rocks*, 30 Jun. 2020, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/reflections-on-the-curse-of-racism-in-the-u-s-military/>.

Gen. C.Q. Brown, Jr., "What I'm Thinking About," 5 Jun. 2020, <https://youtu.be/mx0HnOTUkVI>.

Further Reading

Paul Kennedy, "Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition," in *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, ed. Paul Kennedy (Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 1–7.

Rebecca Friedman Lissner, "What Is Grand Strategy? Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," *Texas National Security Review*, vol. 2, no. 1 (2018), pp. 53–73.

Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (The Free Press, 1986).

Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

25 Aug. The Formation of American Grand Strategy

Kick-Off Discussion Question

Who do you think has been the greatest American foreign policy/national security grand-strategist, whether policy official, scholar, writer, or other?

Prompts for the Readings

What were the principal goals of US foreign policy prior to the twentieth century?

How true to democratic principles were US policy-makers?

Core Readings

John Winthrop, “City Upon a Hill,” 1630, <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/winthrop.htm>.

President George Washington, “Farewell Address,” 19 Sept. 1796, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp.

Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, “Go Not Abroad in Search of Monsters to Destroy,” 4 Jul. 1821, <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/repository/she-goes-not-abroad-in-search-of-monsters-to-destroy/>.

President James Monroe, “Message at the Commencement of the First Session of the Eighteenth Congress (The Monroe Doctrine),” 2 Dec. 1823, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/monroe.asp.

John O’Sullivan, “Manifest Destiny,” Nov. 1839, <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/osulliva.htm>.

President William McKinley, “The Imperial Gospel,” 1899, <http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5575/>.

Mark Twain, “The Battle Hymn of the Republic, Updated,” 1900, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Battle_Hymn_of_the_Republic_Updated.

“The Platt Amendment to the Constitution of Cuba,” 2 Mar. 1901, <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/platt.htm>.

President Theodore Roosevelt, “Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” 6 Dec. 1904, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Roosevelt_Corollary.

Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Harvard University Press, 2001).

– Chap. 1, “Race and Foreign Relations Before 1945,” pp. 10–22.

Robert Kagan, *Dangerous Nation: America’s Place in the World from Its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the Twentieth Century* (Vintage, 2007).

– Chap. 7, “The Foreign Policy of Slavery,” pp. 181–223.

Thomas G. Paterson, “United States Intervention in Cuba, 1898: Interpretations of the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War,” *The History Teacher*, vol. 29, no. 3 (1996): pp. 341–361.

Further Reading

Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton University Press, 1999).

Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World* (Routledge, 2002).

Greg Grandin, *The End of the Myth: From the Frontier to the Border Wall in the Mind of America* (Metropolitan Books, 2019).

1 Sept. The World at War

Prompts

Was Wilsonianism as pro-democracy as often claimed?

Why did the United States stay isolationist until Pearl Harbor?

What was US grand strategy coming out of World War II?

Core Readings

President Woodrow Wilson, “Safe for Democracy,” 2 Apr. 1917, <http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/4943/>.

“The Atlantic Charter,” 14 Aug. 1941, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp>.

Smedley Butler, Speech on Military Intervention in Latin America, 1933, <https://fas.org/man/smedley.htm>.

Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, rev. ed. (Yale University Press, 2009).

- Chap. 4, “The Perils of Revolution,” pp. 92–124.

Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford University Press, 2007).

- Part 1, “A Spring of Upheaval,” pp. 3–53.

Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Harvard University Press, 2001).

- Chap. 1, “Race and Foreign Relations Before 1945,” pp. 22–44.

Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Cultural and Economic Expansion, 1890–1945* (Hill and Wang, 1982).

- Chap. 8, “The Cooperative State of the 1920s,” pp. 138–160.
- Chap. 9, “Depression and War: 1932–1945,” pp. 161–201.

James Lacey, “Toward A Strategy: Creating an American Strategy for Global War, 1940–1943,” in *The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War*, ed. Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, James Lacey (Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 182–209.

John Strausbaugh, *Victory City: A History of New York and New Yorkers During World War II* (Twelve, 2018).

- Chap. 7, “Springtime for Mussolini,” pp. 63–68.
- Chap. 8, “Hitler’s New York Friends,” pp. 69–75.

Wilson D. Miscamble, “Roosevelt, Truman, and the Development of Postwar Grand Strategy,” *Orbis*, vol. 53, no. 4 (2009): pp. 553–570.

Further Reading

William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941–1945* (Oxford University Press, 1987).

Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (Random House, 2002).

Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930* (Duke University Press, 2004).

8 Sept. Present at the Creation

Prompts

Could the Cold War have been avoided, and Stalin kept a US partner, were it not for unforced US errors?

Was the early Cold War era really a “golden age of bipartisanship”?

Containment was the right strategy for the Soviet threat in Europe, but extending it to the Third World was a mistake. Do you agree or disagree?

Core Readings

G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton University Press, 2001).

– Chap. 3, “An Institutional Theory of Order Formation,” pp. 50–79.

Hal Brands, *What Good is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Cornell University Press, 2014).

– Chap. 1, “The Golden Age Revisited: The Truman Administration and the Evolution of Containment,” pp. 17–58.

General Secretary Iosef V. Stalin, “Bolshoi Speech,” 9 Feb. 1946, <http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1947-2/cold-war/cold-war-texts/stalin-election-speech/>.

‘X’ (George Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 25, no. 4 (1947), pp. 566–582.

Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953* (Yale University Press, 2008).

– Chap. 10, “The Lost Peace: Stalin and the Origins of the Cold War,” pp. 296–320.

Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

– Chap. 4, “Creating the Third World: The United States Confronts Revolution,” pp. 110–157.

President Harry S. Truman, “The Truman Doctrine,” 12 Mar. 1947, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp.

National Security Council Report 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” 14 Apr. 1950, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf.

Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton University Press, 2000).

– Chap. 4, “Holding the Line in Little Rock,” pp. 115–151.

Further Reading

Frank Costigliola, *Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War* (Princeton University Press, 2012).

Sheila Fitzpatrick, *On Stalin’s Team: The Years of Living Dangerously in Soviet Politics* (Princeton University Press, 2015).

Oleg Gorlizki, *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953* (Oxford University Press, 2004).

Michael Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (Cambridge University Press, 1989).

William Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945–1960: The Soul of Containment* (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

15 Sept. Nuclear Deterrence, the Arms Race, and Project Solarium

Prompts

Did nuclear weapons fundamentally revolutionize international politics?

Nuclear deterrence strategy had its supporters and its critics. What is your assessment?

Is the “Solarium for X” model of solving public-policy problems widely and responsibly applicable?

Core Readings

Bernard Brodie, ed., *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (Yale Institute of International Studies, 1946).

– Chap. 1, “The Weapon,” pp. 14–56.

William Stueck, “Reassessing US Strategy in the Aftermath of the Korean War,” *Orbis*, vol. 53, no. 1 (2009): pp. 571–590.

H. W. Brands, “The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State,” *American Historical Review*, vol. 94, no. 4 (1989): pp. 963–989.

Marc Trachtenberg, “A Wasting Asset: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949–1954,” *International Security*, vol. 13, no. 3 (1988): pp. 5–49.

National Security Council Memorandum, “Project Solarium,” 22 Jul. 1953, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d80>.

Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” RAND Corporation Report P-1472 (1958), <https://www.rand.org/about/history/wohlstetter/P1472/P1472.html>.

Further Reading

Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Cornell University Press, 1989).

Brendan Green, *The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War* (Cambridge University Press, 2020).

Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, *The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War* (Yale University Press, 2008).

Saki Dockrill, *Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–1961* (St. Martin’s Press, 1996).

David M. Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956* (Yale University Press, 1994).

22 Sept. The Vietnam War

Prompts

Why, according to the different authors — and you, did the United States go to war in Vietnam?

Why did the United States lose the Vietnam War? Was it winnable but not won? Was it unwinnable from the get-go?

Core Readings

Frances FitzGerald, *Fire in the Lake* (Little, Brown, and Company: 1972)

- Chap. 1, “States of Mind,” pp. 2 (map), 3–31.

Mark Atwood Lawrence, “Explaining the Early Decisions: The United States and the French War, 1945–1954,” in *Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives*, ed. Mark Philip Bradley and Marilyn B. Young (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 23–44.

George C. Herring, *America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975*, 9th ed. (McGraw-Hill, 2014).

- Chap. 4, “Enough, But Not Too Much: Johnson’s Decisions for War, 1963–1965,” pp. 135–176.

Memorandum, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy to President Lyndon Johnson, “The Situation in Vietnam,” 7 Feb. 1965, http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/active_learning/explorations/vietnam/escalate14.cfm.

Memorandum, Under Secretary of State George Ball to Secretary of State Dean Rusk et al., 29 Jun. 1965, <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon4/doc258.htm>.

Memorandum, Under Secretary of State George Ball to President Lyndon Johnson, “A Compromise Solution in South Vietnam,” 1 Jul. 1965, <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon4/doc260.htm>.

Mark Moyar, *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965* (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

- Chap. 15, “Invasion,” pp. 330–349.
- Chap. 16, “The Prize for Victory,” pp. 350–391.
- Chap. 17, “Five Silent Men,” pp. 392–416.

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- Chap. 11, “The Lessons of Vietnam,” pp. 319–322.

Kathleen Belew, *Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America* (Harvard University Press, 2018).

- Intro., pp. 1–18.
- Chap. 1, “The Vietnam War Story,” pp. 19–32.

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Mark Atwood Lawrence, *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History* (Oxford University Press, 2008).

Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (University of California Press, 2001).

Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, *Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam* (University of North Carolina Press, 2012).

29 Sept. D tente

Prompts

Why did the United States and China negotiate the 1971-72 “opening”? What are some lessons about statesmanship and negotiating with adversaries from this case?

Was d tente a noble failure, well-intentions but naive and, in terms of results, largely disastrous?

Core Readings

Simon Miles, “Envisioning D tente: The Johnson Administration and the October 1964 Khrushchev Ouster,” *Diplomatic History*, vol. 40, no. 4 (2016): pp. 722–749.

Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary During the Cold War* (Georgetown University Press, 2015).

- Chap. 3, “Brezhnev: Engagement and D tente, 1965–79,” pp. 37–56.

Hal Brands, *What Good is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Cornell University Press, 2014).

- Chap. 2, “Travails of the Heroic Statesmen: Grand Strategy in the Nixon-Kissinger Years,” pp. 59–101.

Bruce Jentleson, *The Peacemakers: Lessons Learned from Twentieth Century Statesmanship* (W.W. Norton, 2018)

- Chap. 1, “Henry Kissinger, Zhou Enlai and the US-China Opening, 1971–1972,” pp. 4–30.

Sarah Snyder, “‘Jerry, Don’t Go’: Domestic Opposition to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act,” *Journal of American Studies*, vol. 44, no. 1 (2010): pp. 67–81.

Jussi Hanhimäki, “Conservative Goals, Revolutionary Outcomes: The Paradox of Détente,” *Cold War History*, vol. 8, no. 4 (2008): pp. 503–512.

Mark Moyar, “Grand Strategy After the Vietnam War,” *Orbis*, vol. 53, no. 4 (2009): pp. 591–610.

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Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, 2nd ed. (Brookings Institution Press, 1994).

Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Little, Brown, and Company, 1979).

Daniel J. Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s* (Oxford University Press, 2014).

Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente* (Harvard University Press, 2003).

Michael Cotey Morgan, *The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War* (Princeton University Press, 2018).

6 Oct. The End of the Cold War

Prompts

Did Ronald Reagan have a grand strategy?

Of the storied pair, who deserves greater credit for ending the Cold War, Reagan or Gorbachev?

Did the United States win the Cold War, or did the Soviet Union simply lose it?

Core Readings

Thomas M. Nichols, “Carter and the Soviets: The Origins of the US Return to a Strategy of Confrontation,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, vol. 13, no. 2 (2002): pp. 21–42.

James Graham Wilson, “How Grand Was Reagan’s Strategy, 1976–1984?” *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, vol. 18, no. 4 (2007), pp. 773–803.

Hal Brands, *What Good is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Cornell University Press, 2014).

– Chap. 3, “Was There a Reagan Grand Strategy?: American Statecraft in the Late Cold War,” pp. 102–143.

Simon Miles, *Engaging the Evil Empire: US-Soviet Relations, 1980–1985* (Cornell University Press, forthcoming 2020).

– Intro., “Grand Strategy and the End of the Cold War.”

– Chap. 5, “New Departures: The Beginning of the End of the Cold War.”

– Concl., “Winners and Losers.”

Bruce Jentleson, *The Peacemakers: Lessons Learned from Twentieth Century Statesmanship* (W.W. Norton, 2018)

– Chap. 2, “Mikhail Gorbachev: Ending the Cold War, 1985–1991,” pp. 31–61.

Bartholomew H. Sparrow, “Realism’s Practitioner: Brent Scowcroft and the Making of the New World Order, 1989–1993,” *Diplomatic History*, vol. 34, no. 1 (2010): pp. 141–175.

Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shiffrin, “Deal or No Deal?: The End of the Cold War and the US Offer to Limit NATO Expansion,” *International Security*, vol. 40, no. 4 (2016): pp. 7–44.

Further Reading

James Graham Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War* (Cornell University Press, 2014).

Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Cornell University Press, 2002).

Robert Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989–1992* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997).

Jack F. Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (Random House, 2004).

Condoleezza Rice and Philip Zelikow, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Harvard University Press, 1995).

Sarah B. Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

13 Oct. The Unipolar Moment

Prompts

Fukuyama's "end of history" and Huntington's "clash of civilizations" offer two different visions of the post-Cold War world. Analyze both conveying where you agree and disagree.

Why was unipolarity just a "moment?"

Why did 9/11 occur?

Core Readings

Odd Arne Westad, "The Cold War and America's Delusion of Victory," 28 Aug. 2017, *The New York Times*.

John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, vol. 15, no. 1 (1990):

Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," *The National Interest*, no. 16 (1989): pp. 3–18.

Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs*, vol 72, no. 3 (1993): pp. 22–49.

Department of Defense Memorandum, "Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994–1999," 29 Feb. 1992, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb245/doc04.pdf>.

Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide," *The Atlantic*, 1 Sept. 2001, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/>.

Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 1 (1996): pp. 16–32.

Peter Bergen, “What Were the Causes of 9/11?,” *Prospect*, 24 Sept. 2006, <https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/whatwerethecausesof911>.

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The White House, 2002).

– Chap. 5, “Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction,” pp. 13–16.

Stephen Biddle and Peter D. Feaver, “Assessing Strategic Choices in the War on Terror,” in *How 9/11 Changed Our Ways of War*, ed. James Burk (Stanford University Press, 2013), pp. 27–55.

John Mueller and Mark Stewart, “Why Are Americans Still So Afraid of Islamist Terrorism?,” *The Washington Post*, 23 Mar. 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/03/23/why-are-americans-still-so-afraid-of-islamic-terrorism/>.

Further Reading

The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (W.W. Norton, 2004).

Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11* (Public Affairs, 2009).

Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (Alfred A. Knopf, 2006).

Douglas Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism* (HarperCollins, 2008).

20 Oct. The Iraq War & Obama

Prompts

Why, according to the different authors — and you, did the United States go to war in Iraq?

What is your evaluation of the Obama foreign policy?

Core Readings

President George W. Bush, Graduation Speech at the US Military Academy at West Point, 1 Jun. 2002, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>.

George W. Bush, *Decision Points* (Crown, 2010).

– Chap. 8, “Iraq,” pp. 223–271.

Robert Draper, “Colin Powell Still Wants Answers,” *New York Times Magazine*, 17 Jul 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/16/magazine/colin-powell-iraq-war.html>.

Hal Brands, *What Good is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Cornell University Press, 2014).

– Chap. 4, “The Dangers of Being Grand: George W. Bush and the Post-9/11 Era,” pp. 144–189.

Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” Apr. 2016, *The Atlantic*, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>.

Gideon Rose, “What Obama Gets Right: Keep Calm and Carry the Liberal Order On,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 94, no. 5 (2015), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/what-obama-gets-right>.

Bret Stephens, “What Obama Gets Wrong: No Retreat, No Surrender,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 94, no. 5 (2015), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/what-obama-gets-wrong>.

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Colin Dueck, *The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today* (Oxford, 2015).

Derek Chollet, *The Long Game: How Obama Defied Washington and Redefined America’s Role in the World* (Public Affairs, 2016).

27 Oct. Group Project Presentations

Groups will be assigned this date.

3 Nov. Group Project Presentations

Groups will be assigned this date.

10 Nov. Twenty-First Century American Grand Strategy

Prompts

Focusing on at least two of the readings, what are the competing visions for twenty-first century American grand strategy? What are their respective strengths and weaknesses? Where they disagree, with whom do you agree and why?

As a democracy, is the United States simply unable to do grand strategy, bound to lurch between partisan shifts?

Core Readings

Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, *America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century* (Oxford University Press, 2016).

– Chap. 2, “Assessing America’s Global Position,” pp. 14–47.

Barry R. Posen, *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy* (Cornell University Press, 2014).

– Chap. 2, “The Case for Restraint,” pp. 69–134.

Hal Brands, “Fools Rush Out? The Flawed Logic of Offshore Balancing,” *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 38, no. 2 (2015): pp. 7–28.

G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton University Press, 2011).

– Chap. 8, “The Durability of Liberal International Order,” pp. 333–360.

Patrick Porter, “Why America’s Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the US Foreign Policy Establishment,” *International Security*, vol. 42, no. 4 (2018), pp. 9–46.

Charles A. Kupchan, *No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn* (Oxford University Press, 2012).

– Chap. 5, “Alternatives to the Western Way,” pp. 86–145.

– Chap. 7, “Managing No One’s World,” pp. 182–205.

Stephen Wertheim, “The Price of Primary: Why America Shouldn’t Dominate the World,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 99, no. 2 (2020), pp. 19–29.

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The White House, 2017), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.